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Abstract This paper points out the merit of Nagelian reduction, namely to propose a
model of inter-theoretic reduction that retains the scientific quality of the reduced
theory and the merit of functional reduction, namely to take multiple realization into
account and to offer reductive explanations. By considering Lewis and Kim’s
proposal for local reductions, we establish that functional reduction fails to achieve a
theory reduction and cannot retain the scientific quality of the reduced theory. We
improve on that proposal by showing how one can build functional sub-types that
are coextensive with physical realizer types and thereby obtain a theory reduction
that is explanatory and that vindicates the scientific quality of the special sciences.
Keywords Bridge principles . Functional reduction . Multiple realization . Nagelian
reduction . Theory reduction
1 The Motivation for Nagelian Reduction
Consider a theory T1 of a special science with a limited domain of application such
as, for instance, classical genetics or folk psychology. Assume that T1 is true or
approximately true; that its concepts seize natural kinds; that it contains laws or law-
like generalizations, which capture salient causal connections in the world; that it has
ample predictive success, etc. – in short, let T1 be a mature scientific theory. We
wonder how T1 fits into our broader body of knowledge. We have no inclination to
suppose that T1 is about properties – and connections between properties – that do
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not strongly supervene on more basic physical properties. Let us therefore assume
that there is a more basic theory T2 with a broader domain of application that
includes the domain of objects to which T1 refers, such as, for instance, a theory of
molecular biology or physics. Since the domain of objects of T1 is a proper part of
the domain of objects of T2 and since the properties with which T1 is concerned
strongly supervene on the properties with which T2 is concerned, there has to be a
systematic relationship between T1 and T2, including a systematic relationship
between the laws of T1 and the laws of T2 (given that the manner in which the
properties in the focus of T1 are connected with each other, as captured by the laws
of T1, strongly supervenes on the manner in which the properties in the focus of T2
are connected with each other, as captured by the laws of T2).
The reducibility of T1 to T2 is the primary candidate for such a systematic
relationship. If the properties in the domain of T1 strongly supervene on the
properties in the domain of T2, then all the truths about the properties in the domain
of T1 are derivable from the truths about the properties in the domain of T2. This is
not to say that they are a priori derivable; the deduction may need principles that are
established only a posteriori. In the following, we briefly recall the Nagelian model
of deriving the laws of T1 from the laws of T2 and thus the reduction of T1 to T2 (this
section). We then point out how the Nagelian account of theory reduction fails
because of multiple realization and how Lewis and Kim’s model of functional
reduction takes multiple realization into account. However, that model falls short of a
theory reduction; it ends up in the elimination of T1 rather than its reduction to T2
(Section 2). Against this background, the rationale of this paper is to show a way to
develop functional reduction into a model of a fully fledged, conservative theory
reduction, thereby marrying the merits of Nagelian reduction and functional
reduction (Section 3).
In order to be in the position to derive the laws of T1 from the laws of T2, it is
necessary to have concepts proper to T2 and figuring in the laws of T2 at one’s
disposal that cover the extension of the concepts proper to T1 and figuring in the
laws of T1. The issue is only about extension: the meaning (intension) of the
concepts of T1 can remain unrelated to the meaning (intension) of the concepts of T2.
For instance, one can master the concepts “gene,” “phenotypic effects,” “heredity,”
etc., and make reliable predictions in terms of these concepts without understanding
the meaning of the concepts “DNA,” “protein synthesis,” “DNA polymerase,” etc.,
and thus without having any idea about molecular biology. But if one wishes to
derive what classical genetics tells us about genes from molecular biology (or
physics), then one needs a proper molecular concept figuring in laws of molecular
biology that covers the extension of the concept “gene,” the concept of “DNA”
being a suitable candidate for such a concept for the purposes of this paper.
Covering the extension does not necessarily imply coextension, since the domain
of application of T2 – and thus the domain of application of its laws – is usually
broader than the domain of application of T1. But, leaving aside the issue of multiple
realization, this is not a problem: it is logically possible to build within T2 concepts
in the vocabulary proper to T2 that are tailor-made for the domain of application of
the concepts proper to T1 and formulate the laws of T2 in terms of these tailor-made
concepts, insofar as these laws are relevant to the proper part of the domain of
application of T2 that is identical with the domain of application of T1. Assume that
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the concept “gene” covers only that part of the extension of the concept “DNA” of
molecular biology in which DNA sequences are replicated and cause observable
effects like the color of blossoms. It is then possible to build concepts of molecular
genetics (T2) that focus only on such effects of DNA sequences. On that basis, one
may furthermore formulate laws in which these more restricted concepts figure
(insofar as these laws apply only to particular effects of DNA sequences). The
important point is that for each concept proper to T1, one needs one concept proper
to T2 and suitable to figure in the laws of T2 that covers the extension of the concept
proper to T1 in question.
We thus get to the two conditions both necessary and together sufficient that the
textbook accounts of Nagelian reduction, going back to Nagel (1961, Chap. 11)
pose: in order to reduce T1 to T2, one has (a) to build for each concept F proper to T1
and figuring in the laws of T1 a concept P in T2 suitable to figure in the laws of T2
that is coextensive with F so that the following biconditional holds:
8x Fx, Pxð Þ ð1Þ
Furthermore, (b) one has to deduce the laws of T1 from the laws of T2 by means
of such biconditionals. These bridge principles in the form of biconditionals are not
themselves laws of nature, since they relate only the concepts of different theories,
without necessarily telling us anything new about nature (see also Kim 2008, Section
2). But they have to be nomologically necessary in the following sense: in any
possible world in which the laws of T1 and the laws of T2 hold, these biconditionals
are also valid.
In Nagelian reduction, there is no question of T1 being eliminated as a result of its
reduction to T2. If the no miracles argument is a good argument for scientific realism,
that argument applies not only to the more fundamental theory T2, but also to the
special science theory T1, since T1 (e.g., classical genetics or folk psychology)
includes a wide range of successful predictions. The central merit of Nagelian
reduction is that it is a model of theory reduction that permits to retain both T1 and
T2 as part of our system of scientific knowledge.
2 The Motivation for Functional Reduction and Its Limits
Multiple realization is the main objection against Nagelian reduction and inter-
theoretic reduction in general. Even if the properties in the domain of T1 strongly
supervene on the properties in the domain of T2, this does not imply that we can
achieve biconditional links between the concepts proper to T1 and concepts
belonging to T2. Strong supervenience is compatible with multiple realization. The
properties in the domain of T1 can be multiply realized by property configurations of
different types in the domain of T2. Consequently, one cannot infer from the
properties that are given in a certain situation, coming under T1, which (subvenient)
property configurations there are, coming under T2. Therefore, multiple realization
implies the failure of Nagelian reduction as it stands.
However, there is a form of reduction compatible with multiple realization,
namely functional reduction as proposed notably by Lewis (1972; 1980 and 1994)
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and taken up and further developed by Kim (1998 and 2005). Functional reduction
proceeds in three steps:
(1) One defines the property types in the domain of T1 in a functional manner by
indicating notably their characteristic effects in terms of T1 – to put it
differently, the causal roles that tokens of these property types exercise.
(2) One looks for realizers of these causal roles in the domain of the properties of
T2. The realizers of the functionally defined properties may differ physically.
(3) One explains in each case – that is, for each token (and thus independently of
whether or not multiple realization obtains) – why there is a functional property
falling in the domain of T1 by describing how a configuration of properties in
the domain of T2 present in the situation under consideration brings about the
effects that are characteristic of the functional property type in the domain of T1
in question.
For instance, classical genetics defines genes in a functional way. Genes encode
genetic information for the production of phenotypic effects that can be transmitted
from generation to generation (1). The specific causal roles of genes are realized by
molecular configurations, namely certain DNA sequences, though often molecularly
different ones, in most known organisms (2). Molecular biology can explain how
such configurations – notably certain DNA sequences – are copied and transmitted
to the next generation, and how they bring about the effects that are pointed out in
the functional definitions of classical genetics (3).
Functional reduction hence offers in each case, even if there is multiple realization, a
causal explanation of why there is a property token present falling in the domain of T1 by
telling us how the effects that are characteristic of the property type in question are
brought about (cf. what Chalmers 1996, pp. 42–51, calls a reductive explanation).
Functional reduction thereby explains why there are properties falling in the domain of
T1 in the world and thus shows how T1 is about salient properties. More precisely, the
explanation in question is a mechanistic one in the sense of Machamer et al. (2000),
revealing a mechanism that brings about the effects characteristic of a certain property
type in the domain of T1 (see also Kim 2008).
In order to provide such reductive explanations, functional reduction has to rely
on some sort of bridge principles in its step 2 as well (see Endicott 1998, Section 8,
Hüttemann 2004, Chap. 4.3, Marras 2005, pp. 344–347, Fazekas 2009; but see also
Morris 2009 against this claim). The reason is that the definition of the property
types in the domain of T1 (step 1) including the description of their characteristic
effects is carried out in the concepts proper to T1. By contrast, all the properties in
the domain of T2 and their effects are described in the concepts proper to T2. Hence,
in order to be in the position to discern in step 2 a certain configuration of properties
in the domain of T2 as a realizer of a property type in the domain of T1, one has to
create a link between concepts proper to T2 and concepts proper to T1. This link is
generally established on the basis of identifying the effects brought about by a
certain property in the domain of T1 in a given situation with effects brought about
by a configuration of a certain type in the domain of T2 in that situation.
To put it differently, the identification of realizer types does not presuppose
biconditional bridge principles, but is based on the common effects of properties of
T1 and configurations of properties of T2. For instance, molecular biology can
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identify DNA sequences as those configurations that lead to the characteristic effects
of genes (as defined by classical genetics) even though gene tokens of one single
type may differ molecularly. Given that multiple realization does not hinder the
discovery of realizer types (step 2), it is possible to provide, in terms of T2, reductive
explanations (step 3) of why there are properties coming under T1 in the world.
Thus, molecular biology explains why genes have their characteristic effects
(defined by classical genetics, step 1) by outlining the mechanisms of how certain
DNA sequences (step 2) lead to, for instance, the synthesis of proteins that bring
about the phenotypic effects in question, given normal conditions in the organism
and its environment.
To put the matter more formally, one-way conditionals describing a property or
configuration of properties of a certain type in the domain of T2 as a realizer of a
property type in the domain of T1 are sufficient for reductive explanations. Let F be a
concept proper to T1, seizing properties of a certain type in the domain of T1, and let
P1 be a concept proper to T2, seizing properties of a certain type in the domain of T2,
being a realizer of F. In singling out a token x coming under P1 as a realizer of F,
thus coming also under the concept F in T1, one takes for granted a bridge principle
of the following form:
8x P1x! Fxð Þ ð2Þ
Strong supervenience assures us that this connection is at least nomologically
necessary, if not metaphysically necessary: if the concept P1 in T2 describes a
supervenience base for tokens that are described in terms of the concept F in T1 and
thus expresses a sufficient condition for there being tokens that can be described in
terms of F in T1, then whenever there is a configuration of the type P1 in the domain
of T2, there is a token of F in the domain of T1. However, the reverse conditional
does not hold:
8x Fx! P1xð Þ is false: ð3Þ
Due to multiple realization, there may be configurations of the type P2 in the
domain of T2 that also realize F. Consequently, the following one-way conditional
holds also with nomological necessity:
8x P2x! Fxð Þ ð4Þ
Hence, bridge principles in the form of such one-way conditionals are sufficient
for assuring that for each property token coming under F in T1, there is the
possibility of a reductive explanation of that token in terms of concepts that are
proper to T2 (P1 or P2, etc.). The possibility of such a reductive explanation is
secured by the functional character of this model of reduction: assuming the strong
supervenience of higher level properties on lower level properties, the lower level
descriptions P1 and P2 grasp the causal properties that in turn explain how the causal
role defining F is brought about in each case.
Though one-way conditionals are sufficient for the discovery of realizer types and
reductive explanations, one-way conditionals are not sufficient for reducing T1 to T2,
even if the domain of objects of T1 is a proper part of the domain of objects of T2 (T2
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may be a fundamental and universal physical theory). The reason is that one cannot
deduce the laws of T1 from the laws of T2: there are no concepts available in T2 that
are coextensive with the concepts proper to T1 and in which the laws of T2 can be
formulated, insofar as they are pertinent for that part of the domain of objects of T2
that is identical with the domain of objects of T1. Consequently, one cannot deduce the
laws of T1 from laws of T2: the concepts figuring in fundamental and universal laws
of nature (such as, e.g., the laws of gravity or electromagnetism) are too
general in order to deduce the laws of T1 from these laws, and the concepts
proper to T2 that seize particular realizer types of property types of T1 and laws or
law-like generalizations formulated in terms of these concepts are too specific to
capture the property types on which T1 focuses: if there is multiple realization,
several concepts proper to T2 are needed to cover the extension of a single concept
proper to T1.
Nonetheless, Lewis and Kim propose a middle way between reductive explanations
of individual tokens and a full-fledged theory reduction. That middle way, known as
local reduction, is based on considering groups in which a property type of T1 is not
multiply realized. Let us consider an artificial example: assume for the sake of the
argument that pain is a functional property type in which folk psychology (T1) trades.
Suppose that if and only if a human being suffers pain, c-fibers in the human brain are
stimulated. Suppose furthermore that if and only if an octopus suffers pain, b-fibers in
the brain of the octopus are stimulated. In this case, as far as the human species is
concerned, the functional concept “suffers pain” is coextensive with the neurobiolog-
ical concept “c-fibers are stimulated.” Furthermore, as far as the species octopus is
concerned, the functional concept “suffers pain” is coextensive with the neurobiolog-
ical concept “b-fibers are stimulated.” Consequently, the psychological, functional
theory about pain can be reduced to the neurobiological theory about c-fibers in the
case of the human species, and it can be reduced to the neurobiological theory about b-
fibers in the case of the species octopus. We thus need one reducing theory for each
realizer type of a given property type of T1 (see Lewis 1969, 1980 and Kim 1998, in
particular pp. 93–95, and 2005, in particular p. 25).
The theory T1 thus is split into several theories, T1a, T1b, T1c, etc., which are in
turn reduced to several theories, T2a, T2b, T2c, etc., corresponding to the various
realizer types of the property types in which T1 trades. The crucial move in order to
achieve such local reductions, limited to one specific group of realizers, is the
replacement of each multiply realized property type or concept proper to T1 with
several hybrid types or concepts that are relative to particular groups in which there
is uniform realization – such as “pain-in-humans” or “pain-in-octopus,” etc. These
latter concepts are then coextensive with the concepts of a reducing theory each –
“pain-in-humans” is coextensive with “c-fibers are stimulated,” “pain-in-octopus” is
coextensive with “b-fibers are stimulated,” etc. However, these hybrid concepts are
not concepts proper to T1: they cannot be construed in the vocabulary of T1 alone.
The original concepts of T1 are functionally individuated. This means that all the
property tokens coming under the concept F proper to T1 are causally identical from
the point of view of T1. However, given multiple realization, these property tokens
supervene on configurations of physical property tokens that are different from the
point of view of T2 and that are consequently causally heterogeneous. If these
configurations of physical property tokens were not causally heterogeneous, there
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would be no reason to assume that they belong to different physical types. The
problem then is that the patterns of causal regularities that are grasped by T1 are
invisible from the point of view of T2. Consequently, the possibility to account,
within T2, for the ability of T1 to grasp salient patterns of regularities gets lost.
The introduction of hybrid group-specific concepts such as “F in group S1,” “F in
group S2,” etc., cannot alleviate this consequence. These concepts cannot help to make
the ability of T1 to grasp causal regularities that are invisible from the perspective of T2
intelligible. Introducing hybrid group-specific concepts or types simply shifts the
problem raised by multiple realization from the relationship between the types of T1
and the types of T2 to the one obtaining between the types of T1 and these new hybrid
types or concepts. By way of consequence, the homogeneous pattern or natural kind
that T1 seizes by forming a concept F gets lost in this proposal. The uniform type in
which T1 trades by building a concept F is split into group-specific types, whereby the
conjunction of these groups does not have anything in particular in common from the
physical point of view that defines these groups. It is therefore not possible to retrieve
on the basis of concepts such as “F in group S1,” “F in group S2,” etc., a significant
common content “F,” seizing a homogeneous pattern or natural kind in the world. “F”
means something different in S1, S2, etc. This account thereby fails to achieve a key
goal of inter-theoretic reduction, namely to explain how higher level theories are able
to provide homogeneous causal explanations of phenomena that are heterogeneous
from the physical point of view. One therefore ends up in eliminating the functional
types F of T1, as Kim himself concedes:
Unless two realizers of E show significant causal/nomological diversity, there
is no clear reason why we should count them as two, not one. It follows then
that multiply realizable properties are ipso facto causally and nomologically
heterogeneous. This is especially obvious when one reflects on the causal
inheritance principle. All this points to the inescapable conclusion that E,
because of its causal/nomic heterogeneity, is unfit to figure in laws, and is
thereby disqualified as a useful scientific property. … The conclusion,
therefore, has to be this: as a significant scientific property, E has been
reduced – eliminatively. (Kim 1999, pp. 17–18)
E stands here for any functional property type of a special science that is not
identical with a physical property type. This conclusion, however, is devastating for
the project of group-specific reductions: instead of improving on reductive
explanations of individual tokens, going half the way towards a theory reduction,
the basis for such reductive explanations is in fact undermined, if the concepts or
property types F on which T1 focuses itself are de facto eliminated. In a later paper,
Kim urges us to abandon the property types F in which T1 trades as genuine, unitary
types (natural kinds); he nevertheless proposes to retain the concepts proper to T1,
but only as conventions to which no natural kinds, patterns or pertinent similarities
in nature correspond (Kim 2008, pp. 108–112). Thus, again, we have to eliminate the
concepts proper to T1 as classifications that possess a scientific quality.
In this manner, the proposal of a group-specific theory reduction of Lewis and
Kim collapses in fact into the conception known as new wave reductionism (Bickle
1998, 2003) that goes back to Hooker (1981, in particular p. 49). According to this
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latter conception, one constructs within the vocabulary of an encompassing
physical theory T2 a specific reducing theory T2a, T2b,T2c, etc., for each realizer
group of the functional property types F in which a theory T1 of a special science
trades. These group-specific theories formulated in terms of the concepts proper to
T2 then replace T1.
Let us sum up. Given the fact that we have universal and fundamental
physical theories at our disposal, eliminating the scientific quality of the
theories of the special sciences and retaining the kinds in which these theories
trade only for heuristic and practical purposes is an answer to the question of
the unity of science that is easily available, but unsatisfactory. Many of the
theories of the special sciences are mature theories by all standards, having
ample predictive success. If one regards the no miracles argument as a good
argument for scientific realism, one has to take into account the fact that this
argument applies not only to fundamental physics up to molecular chemistry,
but also to many theories of the special sciences. In what follows, we therefore
set out to improve on the functional model of reduction in order to show how
it is possible to vindicate the scientific quality of the special sciences. As we
shall demonstrate, the special sciences grasp objective patterns of similarities,
which cannot be grasped by fundamental theories, and they have consequently
a legitimate status in our body of scientific knowledge rather than simply a
heuristic role. The outcome of our development will be a proposal for a
conservative strategy of functional reduction that does not suffer from the
eliminativist consequences of Kim’s model or new wave reductionism.
3 The Need for Biconditionals and How to Obtain them
If there is multiple realization, then it is not possible to build types or concepts
within a reducing theory T2 that are coextensive with the types or concepts in which
T1 trades and that seize, if T1 is a mature theory with ample predictive success,
natural kinds or at least objective patterns of similarities that exist in the world.
Nonetheless, there are reductive explanations of any token of a property type of T1 in
terms of T2 possible, based on one-way conditionals from concepts proper to T2 to
concepts proper to T1. However, such reductive explanations cannot stand on their
own, for they leave the homogeneous patterns that T1 highlights unconnected to the
types and concepts in which T2 trades. Lewis and Kim’s conception of a local,
group-specific reduction does not improve on this situation, leading on the contrary
to an elimination of the types and concepts proper to T1 from mature science. The
conclusion hence is that we have to relate the types or concepts that are proper to T1
to the types or concepts proper to T2, and we need biconditionals (coextensive types
or concepts) to do so. Lewis and Kim’s conception is therefore on the right track
insofar as it seeks to obtain on the basis of the types or concepts in which T1 trades
more specific types or concepts that are coextensive with types or concepts proper to
T2. The problem is that Lewis and Kim do so by using criteria from T2 that are
foreign to T1 so that the unity of the types or concepts of T1 gets lost by being
relativized to certain groups that are defined in terms of T2. By contrast, we shall
show in this section how one can obtain more fine-grained functional sub-types of
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the types in which T1 trades that are coextensive with types that can be built in T2,
but that are construed by relying only on the conceptual means of T1.
If there are different types of realizers P1, P2, P3, etc., described by T2, of a
property type F of T1, then these realizer types differ not only in their molecular
composition, but also in their causal dispositions. If the differences in composition
did not imply causal differences, we would not be in the position to establish that the
realizers of F come under different physical types. In order to be in the position to
detect differences between them, these differences have to imply the disposition to
react differently in interactions with measuring instruments. The claim that
differences in composition imply causal differences holds not only if one subscribes
to a version of what is known as the causal theory of properties according to which
the causal role is essential to a property so that in all the possible worlds in which
there are properties of the type P, these properties play the same role in each world
(see, e.g., Shoemaker 1980); this claim also holds in a Humean theory of categorical
properties, being pure qualities whose essence is a quiddity and that exercise
different causal roles in different possible worlds depending on the whole
distribution of the fundamental properties in a given world: as far as the relationship
between the functional property types in which the special sciences trade and the
types of physical realizer properties is concerned, whenever there are different
physical realizer types of a given property type F of a special science in the world,
there are, against the background of the whole distribution of the physical properties
in the actual world, differences in the causal relations in which tokens of these
physical property types stand – such as differences in the interaction with measuring
instruments. It is only that these physical property types are themselves multiply
realized by pure qualities of different types, and we cannot detect these latter
differences (that consequence is known as humility; see, e.g., Lewis 2009).
Independently of the metaphysics of properties to which one subscribes, one thus
has to acknowledge that differences in composition, accounting for there being
realizers of different physical types of a given property type F of a special science in
the actual world, imply causal differences. Note that not any odd difference in
composition between two tokens of a realizer of F amounts to there being two
different types of realizers of F and thus a case of multiple realization. To get
multiple realization in a non-trivial sense, the differences in composition have to
concern the way in which F, being defined in a causal manner by certain
characteristic effects, is realized. In other words, differences in composition between
two or more realizer tokens of F amount to there being two or more realizer types of
F if and only if these differences concern the components of the mechanism by
means of which each realizer brings about the effects that characterize F. Against the
background of the fact that differences in composition imply causal differences on
any theory of properties, one thus filters out the causal differences that account for
there being two or more realizer types of F by demanding that the causal differences
concern the way by means of which the effects that characterize F are brought about.
Such causal differences are not limited to the way or mechanism that brings about
the effects that characterize F, leading always to identical effects such that these
differences cannot be detected by employing the conceptual means of the theory in
which F is embedded, that is, T1. As already mentioned, whenever there are
differences in composition, these differences can be detected only if they imply
Marrying the Merits of Nagelian Reduction and Functional Reduction 225
causal differences in the reaction with measuring instruments. A fortiori, differences
in composition that imply different mechanisms or ways to bring about the effects
that characterize F and that thereby amount to there being different types of realizers
of F lead to differences in the interaction with measurement devices. Such
differences are macroscopic differences that can be observed with the naked eye
and can thus be expressed by the conceptual means of common sense. Against that
background, one can easily conceive experimental conditions such that differences in
the way in which the effects that characterize F are brought about lead to causal
differences that can be detected and expressed within the framework of T1, although
that conceptual framework may not be sufficient to explain why such differences
occur.
There is nothing particular about measuring instruments and measuring
interactions. These are by no means natural kinds – such as gravitational or
electromagnetic interaction, and accordingly mass and charge. There is no physical
definition of what constitutes a measuring interaction and a measurement device. In
the present context and for the purposes of this paper, we can therefore simply talk in
terms of the more general notion of environmental context. In certain environmental
contexts – which can be artificially created in a laboratory, but which can also obtain
in nature without human intervention – the differences in the ways in which the
effects that characterize F are brought about, accounting for there being two types of
realizers of F, lead to differences in these effects themselves that can be detected on
the level of description of T1, although presumably not be explained on that level.
The following reasoning adds further support to the claim that, even without
human intervention, differences in realization entail differences that are salient at the
level of description of T1. Consider a possible world w1 at t0, which is identical to
the actual world in any respect and another possible world w2 at t0, which is also
exactly like the actual world from the point of view of T1 but in which there is no
multiple realization: any property token of T1 is realized in w2 by the same type of
configuration from the point of view of T2. It is clear that in such circumstances, w1
and w2 are not distinguishable from the point of view of T1 at t0. However, it seems
reasonable to assume that after a certain length of time, at t0+n, both worlds will
nonetheless be distinguishable from the point of view of T1 as well. In w2, entities
coming under a concept proper to T1 fulfill, due to their physical differences, slightly
different causal roles. These differences lead over time to differences with respect to
the causal evolution of w1 that are likely to be important enough to end up in
differences that are observable using the descriptive resources of T1.
This example assumes that at some point of time, a divergence within the
respective distributions of property tokens described by T1 in w1 and w2 will
occur. It means that at this point of time, an entity coming under a certain concept
F in T1 and a physical concept P1 in w1 and its counterpart in w2, coming also
under F but under P2 instead of P1, will react to their environment in a way that is
sufficiently dissimilar to give rise to a difference between both worlds that can be
grasped by using only the conceptual resources of T1. There are hence
environmental circumstances in which differences in realization lead to functional
differences as well.
Let us illustrate these claims by drawing on classical genetics. Multiple realization
in this field of research is an empirical fact that is not astonishing, since the approach
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of classical genetics is more abstract than the one of molecular genetics. Natural
selection explains why there is multiple realization in the domain of classical
genetics (see Papineau 1993, p. 47, and also Rosenberg 2001): depending on the
environmental conditions, only some of the causal powers of a given molecular
configuration, realizing a property of the type F of classical genetics, are pertinent
for selection. Against this background, it is reasonable that the proper concepts of
classical genetics abstract from molecular differences. There are, for instance,
molecular differences among DNA sequences possible that, under certain cellular
conditions, do not amount to phenotypic (functional) differences.
These molecular differences, as already mentioned, are different ways to bring
about the effects that define F. There then is at least one difference in the production
of side effects that are systematically linked with the main effects in question – such
as different causal interactions with the molecular environment within the cell during
the causal process from a gene to the production of its characteristic phenotypic
effects. For any such difference in side effects, there is a molecular environment
possible in which that difference leads to a detectable functional difference within
the scope of classical genetics and the evolutionary context because any such
difference may become pertinent to selection in certain environments (see Rosenberg
1994, p. 32). Consequently, that difference can in principle also be considered in
terms of the concepts that are proper to classical genetics. One can thus, for instance,
introduce more precise functional definitions that take into account different reaction
norms that are linked to the molecular differences. A reaction norm is a function
defining the different probabilities of fitness contributions of a gene relative to
different environments. Against this background, for any type F of T1 (that is
multiply realized by P1, P2, etc.), it is possible to conceive functional sub-types F1,
F2, etc., taking those side effects in terms of different reaction norms into account
(see also Bechtel and Mundale 1999 as regards the possibility to introduce more
fine-grained functional concepts of the special sciences).
These sub-types are no longer multiply realizable, since any molecular difference
that is relevant to distinguish between different types of realizers leads to specific
functional differences – to a unique reaction norm, for instance. The functionally
defined sub-types hence correspond to one type of molecular configuration each,
bringing about the effects that define F in one particular way. These sub-types thus
are nomologically coextensive with the physical or molecular types P1, P2, etc. By
means of these sub-types, we hence attain types or concepts of classical genetics that
are nomologically coextensive with molecular types or concepts and thus make it
possible to reduce classical genetics to a molecular theory in a functional manner.
More precisely and more generally speaking, (1) within an encompassing
fundamental physical or molecular theory T2, one builds the concepts P1, P2, etc.,
capturing the differences in composition among the physical configurations that are
all described by the same concept F in T1. (2) One makes F more precise by building
functional sub-concepts (sub-types) F1, F2, etc., of F, seizing the systematic side
effects linked to the different ways of producing the effects that define F. Provided
that one such functionally defined sub-concept can be construed for each type of
realizer of F in such a way that the former grasps the functional differences to which
the latter give rise under certain circumstances, it follows that these sub-concepts F1,
F2, etc., are nomologically coextensive with the concepts P1, P2, etc. (3) One can
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reduce any concept F of T1 to T2 via F1, F2, etc., and P1, P2, etc. Starting from T2,
one builds P1, P2, etc., and then deduces F1, F2, etc., from P1, P2, etc., given the
nomological coextension. One gains then F by abstracting from the conceptualiza-
tion of the functional side effects contained in F1, F2, etc, retaining only the main
functional specification they have in common, which is nothing but the functional
definition of F. This abstraction step depends on what the world is like rather than
solely on our heuristic and practical aims. It enables thereby to highlight genuine
causal similarities in the world that Kim’s model and the new wave reductionism
cannot account for. As regards the laws, one can formulate the laws of T1 in terms of
F1, F2, etc., by adding more functional details. Given the nomological coextension,
one can deduce these sub-type laws from the laws of T2, couched in terms of P1, P2,
etc., and then gain the laws of T1 formulated in terms of F by a theory-immanent
abstraction from functional details (that are not relevant in many environmental
contexts) (see Esfeld and Sachse 2011, Chaps. 4 and 5, for more details as regards
the reduction of molecular biology and Soom et al. 2010 for an application of this
strategy to folk psychology).
This account of reduction by means of functionally defined sub-concepts has two
decisive virtues. In the first place, due to the fact that this approach proceeds by
functionalization of the higher level concepts and property types, it yields reductive
explanations of why certain entities making true the application of the concepts P1,
P2, etc., also make true the application of the concepts F1, F2, etc., and thereby the
application of the concept F. Moreover, the physical concepts P1, P2, etc., explain
how certain entities in the worlds fulfill the causal roles defining the concepts F1, F2,
etc., as well as F. This is how this account incorporates the explanatory virtues of
functional reduction.
Secondly, the above-mentioned sub-concepts are not construed in a group-specific
way based on physical criteria, but in terms of purely functional differences only.
Taking the functional definition of F as a starting point, the functional sub-concepts
F1 and F2 of F are distinct only by conceptualizing the different ways in which the
effects that define F are produced. Consequently, F always has the same substantial
“specification of the function” in F1, F2: these sub-concepts clearly express for
biologists what their referents functionally have in common and what their
functional differences are. Consequently, multiple realization turns out to be an
intra-theoretic issue, since the relation between F1, F2 and F is a matter of variation
of the degree of precision in the description of the causal role that characterizes F.
Here, the variation of the degree of precision depends on what environmental
conditions obtain. By contrast, in Lewis’ and Kim’s account, multiple realization
remains an inter-theoretic issue, with respect to which, as argued, the introduction of
group-specific concepts does not provide any help because of their hybrid – both
physical and functional – individuation. This is why the present proposal does not
put the scientific quality of the concept F – its suitability to seize a natural kind –
and the laws couched in terms of F in jeopardy, but vindicates that scientific quality
by systematically linking F and the laws in terms of F with molecular biology, and
finally physics.
Let us point out an additional merit of this proposal that concerns the position
occupied by the special sciences in a comprehensive system of scientific knowledge.
On the basis of in the last resort the fundamental physical laws, one can formulate
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laws in terms of P1, P2, etc., that refer to the properties on which classical genetics
focuses. From those laws, one can deduce genetical laws in terms of F1, F2, etc.,
given the nomological coextension of these concepts. One then reaches the laws and
explanations in terms of F by neglecting the functional side effects originally taken
into account by F1, F2, etc., in order to retrieve the concept F. Since the
“specification of the function” of F is contained in each of its sub-concepts, there
is no threat of elimination for the abstract concept F. The abstract laws of classical
genetics couched in terms of F are non-molecular (non-physical) and not replaceable
by molecular genetics in the sense that there is no single molecular law having the
same extension as any of these laws. The molecular laws are too general, and those
molecular (physical) concepts that focus on the composition of the complex
configurations in question (the concepts P1, P2, etc.) are too restricted. When talking
about complex configurations such as, e.g., genes, or whole organisms, the
molecular concepts focus on their composition. Due to selection there are salient
causal similarities among effects that such complex configurations produce as a
whole although they differ in composition. The concepts seizing these similarities
are therefore with good reason not considered as molecular concepts, but taken to be
concepts of classical genetics. This is why, in addition to providing a conservative
reduction by systematically linking F and the laws in terms of F with molecular
biology, and finally physics, this account of functional reduction vindicates the
scientific indispensability of classical genetics and the special sciences in general,
since it is only by means of abstract functional concepts that we are able to bring out
objective patterns of similarities that apply to relatively large sets of physically
different entities under certain environmental circumstances. None of the current
other accounts of inter-theoretic reduction can provide an equivalent outcome.
In conclusion, the merit of Nagelian reduction is to point out the only way open
for a theory reduction, namely a deduction of the laws of the reduced theory T1 from
the laws of the reducing theory T2 by means of biconditionals. The need for
biconditionals is implicitly also acknowledged in Lewis and Kim’s account, seeking
for group-specific biconditionals. In this paper, we have improved on Lewis and
Kim’s account by replacing the group-specific types with functional sub-types or
sub-concepts that are construed by relying only on the conceptual means of T1 and
that are coextensive with the realizer types described in the vocabulary of T2.
Functional reduction provides, via the notion of physical realization, explanations
of why there are in the world the properties on which the special sciences focus.
However, multiple realization seems to rule out the reduction of the theories of the
special sciences to physical theories. But the reductive, functional explanations of
property tokens in the domain of a theory of the special sciences cannot stand on
their own, as our discussion of Lewis and Kim’s account has made evident, for the
scientific quality of the types in which the special sciences trade then gets lost. By
contrast to what Kim (2008, pp. 108–112) claims, the concepts of the special
sciences are not purely conventional, but seize salient similarities (natural kinds,
homogeneous patterns) in nature, since selection abstracts in many environmental
contexts from physical or molecular differences, but since there always are also
environmental contexts possible in which these very physical or molecular
differences are pertinent to selection, a conservative reduction of the types and
concepts of the special sciences via purely functional sub-types or sub-concepts to
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physical or molecular types or concepts is possible. In thus showing how reductive,
functional explanations can be expanded into a theory reduction via functional sub-
types, we have married the merits of Nagelian reduction and functional reduction –
achieving functional, reductive explanations that are backed up by a theory reduction
that vindicates the scientific quality of the theories of the special sciences.
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